56 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2013 Last revised: 15 Sep 2017
Date Written: September 12, 2017
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and extract more ex post compensation through timely exercise of stock options. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers appear to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.
Keywords: Cartels, price fixing, corporate governance, executive compensation
JEL Classification: D43, G34, K42, L40, M43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Artiga González, Tanja and Schmid, Markus and Yermack, David, Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers? (September 12, 2017). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-13-002; University of St.Gallen, School of Finance Research Paper No. 2013/9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2230771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230771