Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design

Posted: 14 Jun 2000

See all articles by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

An important question is whether the financial safety net reduces market discipline on bank risk taking. For countries with varying deposit insurance schemes, we find that deposit rates continue to reflect bank riskiness. Cross-country evidence suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates at a cost of reduced market discipline. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. Hence, there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline.

JEL Classification: E43, G28

Suggested Citation

Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Huizinga, Harry, Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design (December 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=223081

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2623 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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