Incentives on the Starting Grid in Formula One Racing

The Journal of Sport, 2013, 2(2)

10 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2013 Last revised: 17 Mar 2014

See all articles by Larry McCarthy

Larry McCarthy

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business

Kurt W. Rotthoff

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business

Date Written: March 12, 2013

Abstract

Starting a race in first place, pole position, is the goal of every race driver. This is even more pronounced in Formula One (F1) racing as the road courses they race are more difficult to pass on, providing an additional advantage to starting on the pole. However, their unique standing starts also create a bottleneck at the first turn, which often leads to contact between cars. Because F1 cars are not designed to make contact, this contact can greatly impact a driver’s position on the track. We find that there are certain positions on the starting grid that are more likely to make contact with other drivers than other positions. Specifically the starting position with the highest odds to make contact at the first turn is position 10. This creates the incentive for drivers to avoid this position, which means if they are unable to qualify higher than this position, the incentive exists for drivers to intentionally adjust their behavior to avoid these high-risk (of making contact) positions.

Suggested Citation

McCarthy, Laurence and Rotthoff, Kurt W., Incentives on the Starting Grid in Formula One Racing (March 12, 2013). The Journal of Sport, 2013, 2(2), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2232260 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232260

Laurence McCarthy

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business ( email )

400 South Orange Avenue
South Orange, NJ 07079
United States

Kurt W. Rotthoff (Contact Author)

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business ( email )

400 S Orange Avenue
JH 674
South Orange, NJ 07079
United States
973-761-9102 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pirate.shu.edu/~rotthoku/

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