On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listings

Posted: 17 Mar 2013

See all articles by Nuno Fernandes

Nuno Fernandes

Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics; IMD International

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 16, 2013


Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we show that although firms list in countries with better investor protection, they are less likely to list in countries with excessively stronger investor protection. We provide evidence based on ex ante firm and market characteristics and ex post listing outcomes that our findings are due to lack of investor interest in firms from environments with much weaker investor protection. We also argue that our findings, together with a general trend of improvement in investor protection in many firms’ countries of origin, can explain why U.S. and U.K. exchanges have attracted an increasing number of foreign listings during our sample period.

Keywords: Cross-listings, investor protection, investor interest

JEL Classification: G15, G38, M41, M45, F40

Suggested Citation

Fernandes, Nuno and Giannetti, Mariassunta, On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listings (March 16, 2013). Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2234460

Nuno Fernandes

Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics ( email )

Palma de Cima
Lisbon, 1649-023

IMD International ( email )

Ch. de Bellerive 23
P.O. Box 915
CH-1001 Lausanne

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mariassuntagiannetti/Home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

B-1050 Brussels

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm

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