Competition and Innovation

63 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2013

See all articles by Michele Boldrin

Michele Boldrin

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Juan Allamand

Ministry of Finance, Chile

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Carmine Ornaghi

University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Date Written: March 18, 2011

Abstract

Which kind of intellectual property regime is more favorable to innovation: one that enforces patents or one that does not? Economic theory is unable to answer this question, as valid arguments can be made both for and against patents; hence we must turn to empirical evidence. In this paper, we review empirical evidence gathered by other researchers and add new evidence of our own. We conclude that the evidence suggests that patents do not promote innovation, but instead retard it.

Keywords: innovation and economic growth, new technology, US intellectual property rights, patent reform, monopoly power, American labor productivity, business competition in the United States, government policy

JEL Classification: D40, D42, O30, O31, O32, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Boldrin, Michele and Allamand, Juan and Levine, David K. and Ornaghi, Carmine, Competition and Innovation (March 18, 2011). Cato Papers on Public Policy Vol. 1, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2235077

Michele Boldrin (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-4551 (Phone)
612-624-0209 (Fax)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Juan Allamand

Ministry of Finance, Chile ( email )

Teatinos 120
Santiago, 8340487
Chile

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Carmine Ornaghi

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom

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