Institutions, Democracy and Growth in the Very Long Run
Acta Oeconomica, Volume 63 #4 2013 pp. 493-510
18 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2013 Last revised: 9 Mar 2017
Date Written: 2011
In this paper we tested the hypothesis of the "political" basis for the "economic" rights. We constructed our own variables of political regimes' classification for years 1820-2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between the Democracy's indicators and Economic Growth. Protection of the Private property rights requires, first and foremost, due guaranties for the personal immunity as a key precondition. Power to arrest discretionary undermines any formal guaranties of private property, low taxation benefits etc. Personal immunity should be defended even for "unpleasant" person (say, H. Ford or W. Gates) or for the chieftains' challengers (to make "rights of the meanest … respectable to the greatest"). It means the free speech; religious freedom and other "political rights" should be respected. Democracy, as political competition system weakens governments' power to break personal freedoms and property rights. Here is presented version of the paper initially accepted for publication in 2011 (unedited).
Keywords: Rule of Law, Rule of Force, Personal Rights, Private Property Protection, Economic Growth
JEL Classification: P16, P50, N40, O43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation