Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions
Forthcoming in the Journal of the European Economic Association
68 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2013 Last revised: 27 Nov 2015
Date Written: March 21, 2013
Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or willful ignorance, is an important source of socially harmful behavior. We analyze a Bayesian signaling model of an agent who cares about self-image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action. We show that willful ignorance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior by obfuscating the signal about the decision maker’s preferences, and serves to maintain the idea that the agent would have acted virtuously under full information. We derive several behavioral predictions that are inconsistent with either outcome-based preferences or social-image concern and conduct experiments to test them. Our findings, as well as a number of previous experimental results, offer support for these predictions and thus, the broader theory of self-signaling.
Keywords: prosocial behavior, dictator games, strategic ignorance, self-signaling
JEL Classification: D83, C72, C91
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation