Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 47-78, 2014
60 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2013 Last revised: 31 Mar 2016
Date Written: March 20, 2013
Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are general (rather than unique to the concept of discrimination) and widely accepted provides a plausible (exhaustive) account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit that is not supported by a morally significant fact (a valid reason), or in a way that involves distributive injustice, or both.
Keywords: Discrimination, Moral Significance, Distributive Justice
JEL Classification: K10, K23, K30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Segev, Re'em, Making Sense of Discrimination (March 20, 2013). Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 47-78, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2237557