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Boards, Auditors, Attorneys and Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules

Managerial & Decision Economics, Forthcoming

43 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2013 Last revised: 16 May 2013

Preeti Choudhary

University of Arizona, Eller College of Management

Jason D. Schloetzer

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Jason Sturgess

Queen Mary University of London

Date Written: April 19, 2013

Abstract

We survey the empirical literature on the determinants of firms’ compliance with mandatory SEC disclosure rules. We begin with a discussion of the role of boards of directors, public accounting firms, and corporate attorneys in the preparation and review of mandatory disclosures. We then organize current research into three broad types of variation in compliance: completeness, timeliness, and readability. Our review highlights three interesting areas for future research: (1) studies that examine the relations between completeness, timeliness, and readability within the same research design, (2) studies that assess whether boards of directors, public accounting firms, and corporate attorneys view disclosure compliance as a general firm policy, and (3) studies that investigate the influence of corporate attorneys on mandatory disclosure, as well as studies of disclosure issues that require collaboration between auditors and corporate attorneys. As a first step to address the latter agenda, we investigate whether corporate attorneys affect disclosure and present evidence that corporate attorney fixed effects matter for mandatory disclosure compliance.

Keywords: mandatory disclosure, compliance, disclosure regulation, corporate attorneys, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G14, G18, K22, M40

Suggested Citation

Choudhary, Preeti and Schloetzer, Jason D. and Sturgess, Jason, Boards, Auditors, Attorneys and Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules (April 19, 2013). Managerial & Decision Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2238674

Preeti Choudhary

University of Arizona, Eller College of Management ( email )

Tucson, AZ 85721
United States

Jason D. Schloetzer (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2672 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/jds99/?PageTemplateID=319

Jason Sturgess

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Rd
Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

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