An Equilibrium Model of the African HIV/AIDS Epidemic

72 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2013

See all articles by Jeremy Greenwood

Jeremy Greenwood

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Philipp Kircher

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Cezar Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Michèle Tertilt

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 25, 2013

Abstract

Eleven percent of the Malawian population is HIV infected. Eighteen percent of sexual encounters are casual. A condom is used one quarter of the time. A choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model is constructed to analyze the Malawian epidemic. In the developed framework, people select between different sexual practices while knowing the inherent risk. The analysis suggests that the efficacy of public policy depends upon the induced behavioral changes and general equilibrium effects that are typically absent in epidemiological studies and small-scale field experiments. For some interventions (some forms of promoting condoms or marriage), the quantitative exercise suggests that these effects may increase HIV prevalence, while for others (such as male circumcision or increased incomes) they strengthen the effectiveness of the intervention. The underlying channels giving rise to these effects are discussed in detail.

Keywords: Bayesian learning, circumcision, condoms, disease transmission, HIV/AIDS, homo economicus, Malawi, marriage, policy intervention, sex markets, search, STDs

JEL Classification: D10, D50, E10, I10, O11

Suggested Citation

Greenwood, Jeremy and Kircher, Philipp and Santos, Cezar and Tertilt, Michèle, An Equilibrium Model of the African HIV/AIDS Epidemic (March 25, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239139 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2239139

Jeremy Greenwood

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1505 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://jeremygreenwood.net

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Philipp Kircher

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-6777 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Cezar Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/czrsantos

Michèle Tertilt (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

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