Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy

24 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2013

See all articles by Jakub Kastl

Jakub Kastl

Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Martimort

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF

Date Written: March 2013

Abstract

We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive correlation between delegation and R&D. This result is robust to controlling for the determinants of R&D such as human capital, capital intensity and sectoral or regional effects. We further investigate the determinants of delegation and find that ownership concentration is significantly related to delegation. Among large firms with a dispersed ownership structure, larger ownership concentration implies less delegation, whereas the opposite emerges with more concentrated ownership. Differences between the Northern and Southern regions in terms of firms' propensity to delegate decisions and engage in R&D also emerge.

Suggested Citation

Kastl, Jakub and Martimort, David and Piccolo, Salvatore, Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy (March 2013). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 84-107, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12012

Jakub Kastl (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

David Martimort

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 6112 8614 (Phone)
+33 5 6112 8637 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF ( email )

via de caniana 2
24127
Bergamo, BG 24127
Italy

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