Live Together, Die Alone? The Disparity of Partners' Electoral Fortunes in Coalition Governments

32 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2013

Date Written: October 22, 2012

Abstract

Although it is said that voters fi nd it more difficult to attribute blame and credit for policy-making when a coalition is in office, it is also true that coalitions can manage decision-making in di fferent ways, shaping how the electorate can see the lines of responsibility. We adapt Duch and Stevenson's (2008) model on economic voting under multiparty governments to show to what extent diff erent ways of deciding in each policy jurisdiction aff ect the signal voters receive about each coalition partner's competence. We then o er empirical evidence suggesting that those coalitions in which it is likely that each partner decides policy individually in their jurisdictions are also more likely to end in a greater electoral disparity between their members, and vice versa.

Keywords: Coalition Politics, Accountability, Economic Vote, Responsibility Attribution

Suggested Citation

Falcó-Gimeno, Albert, Live Together, Die Alone? The Disparity of Partners' Electoral Fortunes in Coalition Governments (October 22, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2241111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2241111

Albert Falcó-Gimeno (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona ( email )

Av. Diagonal 684
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
(+34) 934020963 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://falcogimeno.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
29
Abstract Views
394
PlumX Metrics