Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement:
A Reply to Wouter Wils

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2013) (Forthcoming)

20 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2013  

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws

Date Written: March 29, 2013

Abstract

In the inaugural issue of the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Mr. Wils published an article discussing the relationship between compliance programmes and competition law enforcement in the EU. This paper questions some aspects of Mr. Wils’ analysis of compliance programmes, as well as some of its policy prescriptions. The core theme of Mr. Wils’ article is that there are sound policy reasons why the European Commission and the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division do not, and should not, grant a reduction in the amount of fines imposed on companies that have a pre-existing compliance programme. The present paper disagrees with this view and explains why compliance programmes should be rewarded by competition authorities.

Keywords: Compliance, compliance programmes, cartels, fines, competition, European Union, enforcement, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, K48, L40

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien, Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils (March 29, 2013). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2013) (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2241452

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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