Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2013) (Forthcoming)

20 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2013

See all articles by Damien Geradin

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; Geradin Partners

Date Written: March 29, 2013

Abstract

In the inaugural issue of the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Mr. Wils published an article discussing the relationship between compliance programmes and competition law enforcement in the EU. This paper questions some aspects of Mr. Wils’ analysis of compliance programmes, as well as some of its policy prescriptions. The core theme of Mr. Wils’ article is that there are sound policy reasons why the European Commission and the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division do not, and should not, grant a reduction in the amount of fines imposed on companies that have a pre-existing compliance programme. The present paper disagrees with this view and explains why compliance programmes should be rewarded by competition authorities.

Keywords: Compliance, compliance programmes, cartels, fines, competition, European Union, enforcement, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, K48, L40

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien, Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils (March 29, 2013). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2013) (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2241452

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

Geradin Partners ( email )

Avenue Louise 475
Brussels
Belgium

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