Opposite Side of the Same Agenda Setting Coin? DIGs in the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract

I present one of the first multivariate analysis of a rarely used (and rarely studied) aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda setting process — the Court’s power to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted (i.e. a “DIG”). DIGs traditionally have been viewed through a legal model of judicial behavior, but I argue that a complete explanation of DIG behavior requires a focus on both legal and strategic, policy-oriented factors. Using data on DIGs occurring during the Burger Court (1969 to 1985 terms), I develop hypotheses to test this assertion empirically. The findings provide support for the argument that DIGs reflect both legal and strategic, policy-oriented behavior by the Court.

Keywords: DIG, Supreme Court, judicial behavior, agenda setting, certiorari, dismiss as improvidently granted