Power and Governance in Patent Pools

54 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2013 Last revised: 27 Aug 2017

See all articles by Michael Mattioli

Michael Mattioli

Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Date Written: June 3, 2013


This Article presents an original study of the internal governance of patent licensing collectives. This investigation is prompted by a developing belief among legal commentators that cooperative institutions such as patent pools and research consortia point the way forward for American innovation. Until now, however, scholars have not examined the internal governance of such groups. As a result, it has remained unclear whether patent pools encourage innovation, and if so, how. Drawing on fifty-two collective patent licensing agreements in force between 1856 and 2013, this Article shows that patent pools arguably have not encouraged innovation by serving as forums for collective patent valuations. Instead, many such groups incorporate “rough and ready” rules that offer the greatest innovation incentives to repeat players. In light of the unappreciated impact that patent pool design has on innovation, this Article presents a new proposal to mandate the recording of collective patent agreements with a federal agency.

Keywords: Patent law, patent licensing, intellectual property, patent licensing collectives

Suggested Citation

Mattioli, Michael, Power and Governance in Patent Pools (June 3, 2013). Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2014, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 234, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2242922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2242922

Michael Mattioli (Contact Author)

Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelmattioli.org

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