Competing Concepts of Subsidiarity in the Early Warning Mechanism
LUISS Guido Carli School of Government Working Paper No. SOG-WP4/2013
37 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2013
Date Written: March 15, 2013
Abstract
The essay aims at analysing how the relationship between parliaments in the European Union (EU) – the European, the national and the regional parliaments – are shaped after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and how the early warning mechanism can contribute to promoting their participation in the EU decision-making. Indeed, the control of compliance of draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity appears as a key-element for enhancing the parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, as it is the opportunity to develop new institutional mechanisms, like the 'political dialogue', in spite of the political nature and function of this control. This essay is based on Neil MacCormick's theory on the subsidiarity principle and, in particular, on the assumptions that what is called 'democratic deficit' in the EU is in reality a 'subsidiarity deficit'. Here it is argued that the 'subsidiarity deficit' can be contrasted by the early warning mechanism introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and by the cooperation among the Parliaments of the EU.
Keywords: European Union, principle of subsidiarity, early warning mechanism, national parliaments, ‘political dialogue’
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