Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy

43 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2013

See all articles by Emanuele Bracco

Emanuele Bracco

Lancaster University

Francesco Porcelli

University of Warwick

Michela Redoano

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 31, 2013

Abstract

This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.

Keywords: political competition, government, accountability, tax salience

JEL Classification: H110, H200, H770, H870, D700, N120

Suggested Citation

Bracco, Emanuele and Porcelli, Francesco and Redoano, Michela, Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy (March 31, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2244783 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2244783

Emanuele Bracco

Lancaster University ( email )

Lancaster - LA1 4YW
United Kingdom

Francesco Porcelli

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Michela Redoano (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
+44 24 7652 3474 (Phone)
+44 24 7652 3032 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
158
Abstract Views
898
rank
238,172
PlumX Metrics