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Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment

Journal of Law and Courts, Vol 1, 3-34, Forthcoming

USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 13-11

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C13-10

33 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2013 Last revised: 11 Nov 2013

Gillian K. Hadfield

USC Law School and Department of Economics

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about the emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.

Keywords: legal order, rule of law, coordination, collective punishment

JEL Classification: K1, K4, N40

Suggested Citation

Hadfield, Gillian K. and Weingast, Barry R., Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment (2013). Journal of Law and Courts, Vol 1, 3-34, Forthcoming; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 13-11; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C13-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2245671

Gillian K. Hadfield (Contact Author)

USC Law School and Department of Economics ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-821-6793 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

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