Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests
Univ. Pompeu Fabra, Economics and Business Working Paper No. 441
56 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2000
Date Written: August 2001
Abstract
Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of ?social preferences?. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare?sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients?than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: They withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior.
Keywords: Difference Aversion, Fairness, Inequity Aversion, Social Welfare, Non-Ultimatum Games, Reciprocal Fairness, Social Preferences, Ultimatum Games.
JEL Classification: A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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