Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2246031
 


 



Ordinal and Cardinal Solution Concepts for Two-Sided Matching


Federico Echenique


California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Alfred Galichon


NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute

April 23, 2014


Abstract:     
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable - and in the nontransferable - utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: matching, stability, efficiency

JEL Classification: C78


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Date posted: April 6, 2013 ; Last revised: July 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Echenique, Federico and Galichon, Alfred, Ordinal and Cardinal Solution Concepts for Two-Sided Matching (April 23, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2246031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2246031

Contact Information

Federico Echenique
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
313 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
Alfred Galichon (Contact Author)
NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute ( email )
269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
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