Ordinal and Cardinal Solution Concepts for Two-Sided Matching

29 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2013 Last revised: 25 Jul 2014

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Alfred Galichon

NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute

Date Written: April 23, 2014

Abstract

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable - and in the nontransferable - utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

Keywords: matching, stability, efficiency

JEL Classification: C78

Suggested Citation

Echenique, Federico and Galichon, Alfred, Ordinal and Cardinal Solution Concepts for Two-Sided Matching (April 23, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2246031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2246031

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

313 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Alfred Galichon (Contact Author)

NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

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