Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance

Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-18

34 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2013  

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz

Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Date Written: April 8, 2013

Abstract

Cartel detection has been an important part of antitrust scholarship and policy for some time. Most of the development of the literature on cartel detection has focused at the firm level. This should not be surprising since industrial organization studies firms and markets. Antitrust scholarship has not focused as much on compliance and corporate governance within a given firm. Understanding the internal workings of firms would allow for closer to optimal deterrence, as this understanding would allow for calibrating policy around the incentives within a given firm, its subunits and individuals who work therein, to comply with antitrust law.

Both theoretical and empirical work in a number of different fields, including economics, accounting, finance, organizational theory and sociology provide important insights indicating that a firm is not merely a single entity in its actions. Rather, a firm is made up of a number of various components, each of which has its own incentives that shape firm behavior. This chapter reviews both the antitrust and the non-antitrust literatures on compliance and corporate governance to provide a clearer picture of the extant literature and the theoretical and empirical gaps within the antitrust literature to better inform antitrust policy on detecting cartels. This chapter explores the scholarship both within and outside of antitrust to better understand internal detection of wrongdoing and improved compliance in the antitrust cartel context.

Keywords: antitrust, cartels, competition law, compliance, corporate governance, empirical, collusion, price fixing, corporate wrongdoing, enforcement, leniency, corporate crime

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. and Sokol, D. Daniel, Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance (April 8, 2013). Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2246564

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz

Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )

22 Cortlandt Street
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10007
United States
(917) 499-4944 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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