Strategic Games of the Violence in the Civil Wars

Perfil de Coyuntura Económica, Forthcoming

34 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2013

See all articles by Fernando Estrada

Fernando Estrada

Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales

Date Written: April 9, 2013

Abstract

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/Nozick/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, Nozick’s agencies and the protection, and Gambetta’s recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

Keywords: Civil War, Colombia, armed conflict, drug trafficking, organized crime, paramilitary counterinsurgency war, Game Theory and inconsistent information

JEL Classification: C7, C72, C71

Suggested Citation

Estrada, Fernando, Strategic Games of the Violence in the Civil Wars (April 9, 2013). Perfil de Coyuntura Económica, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2247464

Fernando Estrada (Contact Author)

Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales ( email )

Calle 12 # 0 - 85 Este, Barrio La Candelaria
Bogota, DC Cundinamarca 1267
Colombia
05-71 - 3419900 - ext. 1202 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ideas.repec.org/f/pga454.html

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