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Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits

Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 2013, pp. 18-24

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-26

8 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2013 Last revised: 1 Jul 2013

Stephen G. Gilles

Quinnipiac University School of Law

Nelson Lund

George Mason University School of Law

Date Written: April 10, 2013

Abstract

In response to the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, some legislatures are considering proposals to require all gun owners to purchase liability insurance. Although this idea is not without merit, a mandatory insurance regime could easily be designed (either deliberately or inadvertently) in a way that would unnecessarily compromise the Second Amendment rights of individuals. This article provides an analysis that could contribute to designing mandatory liability insurance laws that deserve to be upheld by the courts charged with protecting the constitutional rights of American citizens.

Keywords: accidental, Chicago, competitive pressure, Connecticut, control, D.C. v. Heller, direct government regulation, fourteenth, high-risk, law-abiding, low-risk, McDonald, malicious shootings, misuse, Newtown, possession, public safety, sale, self defense, substantial relationship, tort, Supreme Court

JEL Classification: G22, K13, K14

Suggested Citation

Gilles, Stephen G. and Lund, Nelson, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits (April 10, 2013). Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 2013, pp. 18-24; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2248133

Stephen G. Gilles

Quinnipiac University School of Law ( email )

275 Mt. Carmel Ave.
Hamden, CT 06518
United States
203-582-3284 (Phone)
203-582-3244 (Fax)

Nelson Robert Lund (Contact Author)

George Mason University School of Law ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8045 (Phone)

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