Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons

32 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2003

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ben Depoorter

UC Hastings Law; Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society; Ugent - CASLE

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Abstract

Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.

JEL Classification: K00, K11

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben and Schulz, Norbert, Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32, Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=224844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224844

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)

UC Hastings Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,885
Abstract Views
13,676
rank
10,186
PlumX Metrics