32 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2003
Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.
JEL Classification: K00, K11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben and Schulz, Norbert, Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32; Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=224844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224844