Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

59 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2013 Last revised: 31 May 2013

See all articles by Eric Weese

Eric Weese

Yale University Department of Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2013

Abstract

Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

Keywords: Boundaries, Mergers, Moment Inequalities, Municipalities

JEL Classification: C63, D71, H77

Suggested Citation

Weese, Eric, Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (April 1, 2013). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1022, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 113, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2250023

Eric Weese (Contact Author)

Yale University Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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