Download This PaperPolitical Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations
59 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2013 Last revised: 21 Apr 2013
Date Written: April 1, 2013
Abstract
Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.
Keywords: Boundaries, Mergers, Moment Inequalities, Municipalities
JEL Classification: C63, D71, H77
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Weese, Eric, Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (April 1, 2013). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1022, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 113, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2250023
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