7 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2013
Date Written: April 15, 2013
"Most Favored Nation" contractual provisions have come under scrutiny in recent years by antitrust authorities in both the US and EU. MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers and buyers. The literature has recognized that there may be efficiency rationales for these arrangements but the literature has also recognized that these arrangements have anticompetitive potential. In this paper, we distill the economics literature on MFNs to explore both possibilities.
Keywords: Most Favored Nation, Most Favored Customer, Antitrust
JEL Classification: L13, L14, L42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Baker, Jonathan B. and Chevalier, Judith A., The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions (April 15, 2013). Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2251165