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The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions

7 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2013  

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law

Judith A. Chevalier

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 15, 2013

Abstract

"Most Favored Nation" contractual provisions have come under scrutiny in recent years by antitrust authorities in both the US and EU. MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers and buyers. The literature has recognized that there may be efficiency rationales for these arrangements but the literature has also recognized that these arrangements have anticompetitive potential. In this paper, we distill the economics literature on MFNs to explore both possibilities.

Keywords: Most Favored Nation, Most Favored Customer, Antitrust

JEL Classification: L13, L14, L42

Suggested Citation

Baker, Jonathan B. and Chevalier, Judith A., The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions (April 15, 2013). Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2251165

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4315 (Phone)

Judith A. Chevalier (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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