Corporate Dystopia: The Ethics of Corporate Political Spending

53 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2013 Last revised: 12 Jun 2013

Date Written: January 21, 2012

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the moral permissibility of corporate political activities under the existing legal framework in the United States. I unpack and examine the standard case for and against the involvement of business in lobbying and electoral activities. And I provide six objections against the standard arguments and propose that the wrongness of corporate political activities does not have much to do with its potential social consequences but rather with non-consequentialist considerations. My ultimate aim is to make sense of the intuition that corporate political spending is morally objectionable. I argue that my case against corporate political spending fares better than the standard case. What is wrong with the current system of regulation of corporate lobbying and campaign finance is that it is inconsistent with the principles of political equality and consent. It follows that by taking advantage of this unfair regulatory framework, business firms are making a contribution to undermine the basis of a robust democratic regime at both the societal and the corporate level.

Keywords: corporate political activities, political equality, corruption, free speech, consent

JEL Classification: D72, G3

Suggested Citation

Alzola, Miguel A., Corporate Dystopia: The Ethics of Corporate Political Spending (January 21, 2012). Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2251588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2251588

Miguel A. Alzola (Contact Author)

Fordham University ( email )

1790 Broadway Ave, 11th FL, Suite 1144
New York, NY New York 10019
United States
(646) 312-8243 (Phone)
(646) 312-8295 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/facultydirectory/legal--ethical-studies/malzola.html

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
153
Abstract Views
952
rank
189,939
PlumX Metrics