How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops

38 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 26 Aug 2010

See all articles by Nicholas Barberis

Nicholas Barberis

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maxim Boycko

Russian Privatization Center

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Natalia Tsukanova

The Boston Consulting Group

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1995

Abstract

We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as capital renovation, change in suppliers, increase in hours that stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role that new human capital plays in economic transformation.

Suggested Citation

Barberis, Nicholas and Boycko, Maxim and Shleifer, Andrei and Tsukanova, Natalia, How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (May 1995). NBER Working Paper No. w5136. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225201

Nicholas Barberis (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Maxim Boycko

Russian Privatization Center

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Natalia Tsukanova

The Boston Consulting Group

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Netherlands

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