Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features
24 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2000 Last revised: 11 Jun 2020
Date Written: October 1995
Abstract
The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange- rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems to support the practical importance of these mechanisms.
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