How Do Entrenched Boards Reduce Human Rights Violations? An Empirical Analysis

13 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2013

See all articles by Pandej Chintrakarn

Pandej Chintrakarn

Mahidol University International College (MUIC)

Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard

Sasin GIBA

Pornsit Jiraporn

Pennsylvania State University - School of Graduate Professional Studies (SGPS)

Date Written: April 18, 2013

Abstract

As part of corporate social responsibility, companies invest in activities that promote human rights or refrain from activities that violate human rights. Investments in human rights, however, usually do not yield immediate benefits. Rather, they are expected to improve the reputation of the firm over time as a good corporate citizen. As one of the most effective takeover defenses, a staggered board insulates managers from the takeover market. Secured in their positions, managers are less likely to be myopic and are more likely to adopt policies that yield long-term benefits, such as investments in human rights. Consistent with this notion, our results show that firms with a staggered board exhibit much better human rights performance. We also show that our results are not likely driven by endogeneity.

Keywords: staggered boards, classified boards, managerial entrenchment, human rights, corporate social responsibility

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Chintrakarn, Pandej and Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn and Jiraporn, Pornsit, How Do Entrenched Boards Reduce Human Rights Violations? An Empirical Analysis (April 18, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2253646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2253646

Pandej Chintrakarn

Mahidol University International College (MUIC) ( email )

999 Buddhamonthon 4 Road
Salaya, Nakhonpathom, 73170
Thailand
66 (0) 2441 5090 (Phone)
66 (0) 2441 9745 (Fax)

Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard

Sasin GIBA ( email )

Bangkok
Thailand

Pornsit Jiraporn (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - School of Graduate Professional Studies (SGPS) ( email )

30 E. Swedesford Road
Malvern, PA 19355
United States
(484) 753-3655 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/pxj11/index1.html

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