Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example

43 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2000

See all articles by Mats Persson

Mats Persson

Stockholm University; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Torsten Persson

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lars E. O. Svensson

Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: September 1996

Abstract

The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives to, an increase in inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: with Swedish data from 1994, these gains would have been an annual real flow of 3-4 percent of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100 percent of GDP. They would mainly have arisen from the nominalistic features of the tax and transfer systems rather than from the traditional sources: seignorage and real depreciation of the public debt. The welfare costs of such an inflation increase would have been even larger, however, and would thus have reduced net welfare. Possible institutional reforms, aimed at making the political costs of inflation more equal to the social costs, are presented and discussed

Suggested Citation

Persson, Mats and Persson, Torsten and Svensson, Lars E.O., Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example (September 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5772. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225587

Mats Persson (Contact Author)

Stockholm University ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Torsten Persson

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden
+46 8 163066 (Phone)
+46 8 164177 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
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Lars E.O. Svensson

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://larseosvensson.se

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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