A Bargaining Theory of Trade Invoicing and Pricing

56 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2013

See all articles by Linda S. Goldberg

Linda S. Goldberg

Federal Reserve Bank of New York; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cédric Tille

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2013

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model of international trade pricing in which individual exporters and importers bargain over the transaction price and exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. We find that the choice of price and invoicing currency reflects the full market structure, including the extent of fragmentation and the degree of heterogeneity across importers and across exporters. Our study shows that a party has a higher effective bargaining weight when it is large or more risk tolerant. A higher effective bargaining weight of importers relative to exporters in turn translates into lower import prices and greater exchange rate pass-through into import prices. We show the range of price and invoicing outcomes that arise under alternative market structures. Such structures matter not only for the outcome of specific exporter-importer transactions, but also for aggregate variables such as the average price, the average choice of invoicing currency, and the correlation between invoicing currency and the size of trade transactions.

Keywords: currency, invoicing

JEL Classification: F30, F40

Suggested Citation

Goldberg, Linda S. and Tille, Cedric, A Bargaining Theory of Trade Invoicing and Pricing (April 2013). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 611. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2256136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256136

Linda S. Goldberg (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-2836 (Phone)
212-720-6831 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Cedric Tille

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI) ( email )

PO Box 136
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/cedrictilleheid/home

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