Maintaining Adequate Bank Capital

Mark J. Flannery

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

April 1, 2013

Forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

The Basel framework has produced complex definitions of “adequate” capital, expressed in terms of book (accounting) ratios. However, solvency actually depends not on accounting ratios but on private investors’ valuation of the firm’s assets’ and liabilities’ market values. At large banking firms, short-term liability-holders key off the firm’s economic solvency when deciding whether to renew their claims. Runs can cause a large bank’s failure regardless of its book capital ratio. Yet supervisors have been largely unable to maintain minimum risk-bearing capacity at large institutions. Actual default probabilities have often exceeded the 0.1% annual rate to which Basel II was calibrated. Over the past 25 years, the median probability of failure (PD) was 0.55%, with some large banks substantially higher. The value of conjectural guarantees has averaged 11.41% of the largest 25 U.S. BHCs’ equity value. I conclude by discussing the extent to which orderly resolution or contingent capital bonds might improve supervisory oversight.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: capital adequacy, bank failures, Basel

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 30, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Flannery , Mark J., Maintaining Adequate Bank Capital (April 1, 2013). Forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258181

Contact Information

Mark Jeffrey Flannery (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )
P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States
352-392-3184 (Phone)
352-392-0103 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 963
Downloads: 286
Download Rank: 79,570