Optimal Fiscal Action in an Economy with Sovereign Premia and Without Monetary Independence: An Application to Italy

49 Pages Posted: 1 May 2013

See all articles by Apostolis Philippopoulos

Apostolis Philippopoulos

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); University of Essex

Petros Varthalitis

Athens University of Economics and Business

Vanghelis Vassilatos

University of Ioannina - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 30, 2013

Abstract

We welfare rank various tax-spending policies. The setup is a New Keynesian model of a semi-small open economy featuring sovereign risk premia and loss of monetary policy independence. The model is calibrated to match data from the Italian economy 2001-2011. We compute various optimized state-contingent tax-spending policy rules when the policy aim is shock stabilization and/or debt consolidation.

Keywords: feedback policy rules, New Keynesian, sovereign premia

JEL Classification: E600, F300, H600

Suggested Citation

Philippopoulos, Apostolis and Varthalitis, Petros and Vassilatos, Vanghelis, Optimal Fiscal Action in an Economy with Sovereign Premia and Without Monetary Independence: An Application to Italy (April 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4199, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2258318

Apostolis Philippopoulos (Contact Author)

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics ( email )

76 Patission Street
GR-10434 Athens
Greece
+301 322 3187 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Petros Varthalitis

Athens University of Economics and Business ( email )

Vanghelis Vassilatos

University of Ioannina - Department of Economics ( email )

45110 Ioannina
Greece

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