Government Ideology and Tuition Fee Policy: Evidence from the German States

32 Pages Posted: 1 May 2013

See all articles by Bjoern Kauder

Bjoern Kauder

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Niklas Potrafke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: April 30, 2013

Abstract

In January 2005 the German Supreme Court permitted the state governments to charge tuition fees. By exploiting the natural experiment, we examine how government ideology influenced the introduction of tuition fees. The results show that rightwing governments were active in introducing tuition fees. By contrast, leftwing governments strictly denied tuition fees. This pattern shows clear political alternatives in education policy across the German states: the political left classifies tuition fees as socially unjust; the political right believes that tuition fees are incentive compatible. By the end of 2014, however, there will be no tuition fees anymore: the political left won four state elections and abolished tuition fees. In Bavaria the rightwing government also decided to abolish tuition fees because it feared to become elected out of office by adhering to tuition fees. Electoral motives thus explain convergence in tuition fee policy.

Keywords: tuition fees, education policy, government ideology, partisan politics

JEL Classification: D720, I220, I280, H750

Suggested Citation

Kauder, Bjoern and Potrafke, Niklas, Government Ideology and Tuition Fee Policy: Evidence from the German States (April 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4205, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258357

Bjoern Kauder

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Niklas Potrafke (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
301
PlumX Metrics