Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands

53 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2000 Last revised: 8 Oct 2022

See all articles by Arie Kapteyn

Arie Kapteyn

University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Klaas de Vos

CentERdata; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Date Written: August 1997

Abstract

Compared to other industrialized countries, the labor force participation of the elderly in the Netherlands is very low. Moreover, it has fallen very fast over recent years. We discuss the incentives for employees to retire, arising from public schemes such as social security and disability insurance, and from private arrangements, such as early retirement and occupational pensions. In general, the generous replacement rates offered by these schemes act as powerful stimuli for retirement. Although Dutch research into the retirement effects of the earnings replacing schemes for the elderly was limited until the early nineties, there is now a fast growing literature on this. This literature confirms the findings in the current paper.

Suggested Citation

Kapteyn, Arie and de Vos, Klaas, Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands (August 1997). NBER Working Paper No. w6135, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225899

Arie Kapteyn (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

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United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Klaas De Vos

CentERdata ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, NL 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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