Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates after Twombly & Iqbal

63 Pages Posted: 4 May 2013 Last revised: 8 Jul 2014

Victor Abel Pereyra

Independent

Benjamin Sunshine

Moskowitz, Mandell, Salim & Simowitz, P.A.

Date Written: May 2, 2013

Abstract

A party’s decision to settle may be affected by the plausibility pleading standard required by Twombly. While previous empirical studies have focused on motions to dismiss, this study attempts to find a relationship between settlement rates and the pleading standard. Our data and analysis show that the probability of settling after Twombly has decreased while the rates of settlements themselves are increasing. In particular, IP and civil rights cases are especially likely to settle and "meritorious" claims settle at a higher rate than "non-meritorious" claims. These findings question the current arguments that the Twombly pleading standard may be inhibiting access to justice and/or improving efficiency. The goal of conserving judicial resources may have been circumvented by litigant behavior as more cases are going on to litigation rather than settling. The access to justice arguments may have also been challenged in that more cases are being adjudicated after Twombly instead of less.

Keywords: Settlement, Twombly, Iqbal

Suggested Citation

Pereyra, Victor Abel and Sunshine, Benjamin, Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates after Twombly & Iqbal (May 2, 2013). University of Illinois Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2259766

Victor Abel Pereyra (Contact Author)

Independent

No Address Available

Benjamin Sunshine

Moskowitz, Mandell, Salim & Simowitz, P.A. ( email )

800 Corporate Drive, Suite 500
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334
United States

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