SIGN IN
Email
This field is required Password This field is required Sign in
Remember me
Forgot ID or Password?
|
||
Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the NumbersVasiliki E. AthanasakouLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Accounting Daniel FerreiraLondon School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Lisa GohHong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance January 31, 2016 ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 360 Abstract: We study changes in CEO stock option grants. Unlike most of the literature, we focus on the number rather than the value of options granted. We first provide a detailed description of the main aggregate trends in CEO stock option grants. We then consider the cross-sectional heterogeneity in option-granting activity. We find that CEOs who either overinvest or underinvest subsequently receive fewer stock options as part of their compensation packages. CEOs who hold exercisable deeply-in-the-money options (overconfident CEOs) also receive fewer stock options in subsequent periods. Our findings provide insights into the dynamics of CEO compensation contracts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36 Keywords: corporate investment, stock options grants, earnings management, CEO overconfidence JEL Classification: G30, G32, J33, M41, M52 Date posted: May 4, 2013 ; Last revised: February 3, 2016Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
