Unions and Managerial Pay

43 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2000

See all articles by John E. DiNardo

John E. DiNardo

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kevin F. Hallock

Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jörn-Steffen Pischke

London School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 1997

Abstract

Unions compress the wage distribution among workers covered by union contracts. We" ask whether unions also have an effect on the managers of unionized firms. To this end we" collected and assembled data on unionization and managerial pay within firms and industries in" the U.S. and across countries. Generally, we find a negative correlation between executive" compensation and unionization in our cross-section data, but no relationship of changes in" unionization on the growth of compensation of executives over time. Using NLRB elections" data, we find that a loss of union members due to decertification elections is associated with" higher CEO pay, although our estimates are imprecise. With CPS data we consistently find that" where unions are stronger, fewer managers are employed.

Suggested Citation

DiNardo, John and Hallock, Kevin F. and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (Steve), Unions and Managerial Pay (December 1997). NBER Working Paper No. w6318. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226072

John DiNardo (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Kevin F. Hallock

Cornell University ( email )

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jörn-Steffen (Steve) Pischke

London School of Economics ( email )

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London WC2A 2AE
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+44 207 955 7595 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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