Concessions and Repression in Conflict

50 Pages Posted: 5 May 2013 Last revised: 9 Jun 2017

See all articles by Akifumi Ishihara

Akifumi Ishihara

University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science

Prakarsh Singh

Amherst College - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 21, 2015

Abstract

We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression, or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in Hansen (2000) and find evidence consistent with the model.

Keywords: Civil War, Concessions, Repression

JEL Classification: D02, D74, O12

Suggested Citation

Ishihara, Akifumi and Singh, Prakarsh, Concessions and Repression in Conflict (July 21, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2260885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2260885

Akifumi Ishihara (Contact Author)

University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science

Hongo 7-3-1
Bunkyo
Tokyo, TOKYO 113-0033
Japan

Prakarsh Singh

Amherst College - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 5000
Amherst, MA 01002-5000
United States
413-542-2271 (Phone)

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