Government Transparency and Expenditure in the Rent‐Seeking Industry: The Case of Japan for 1998–2004

13 Pages Posted: 7 May 2013

See all articles by Eiji Yamamura

Eiji Yamamura

Seinan Gakuin University

Haruo Kondoh

Seinan Gakuin University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This article uses Japanese prefecture‐level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture‐specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent‐seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.

JEL Classification: D73, D78, H79

Suggested Citation

Yamamura, Eiji and Kondoh, Haruo, Government Transparency and Expenditure in the Rent‐Seeking Industry: The Case of Japan for 1998–2004 (July 2013). Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 31, Issue 3, pp. 635-647, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2261544 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/coep.12001

Eiji Yamamura (Contact Author)

Seinan Gakuin University ( email )

6-2-92 Nishijin
Sawara-ku
Fukuoka 814-8511
Japan

Haruo Kondoh

Seinan Gakuin University - Department of Economics ( email )

6-2-92 Nishijin Sawara-ku
Fukuoka, 814-8511
Japan

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