Matching and Anonymity

18 Pages Posted: 9 May 2013

See all articles by Charalambos D. Aliprantis

Charalambos D. Aliprantis

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

Daniela Puzzello

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

This work introduces a set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral matching processes and studies their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based on the agents’ matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate different degrees of “informational isolation” in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.

Keywords: Bilateral matching, Frictions, Anonymous trading, Spatial interactions

Suggested Citation

Aliprantis, Charalambos D. and Camera, Gabriele and Puzzello, Daniela, Matching and Anonymity (2005). Economic Theory, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2262202

Charalambos D. Aliprantis

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Gabriele Camera (Contact Author)

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www1.chapman.edu/~camera/

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Daniela Puzzello

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

410 David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory
Urbana, IL 61801
United States
2173330645 (Phone)

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