Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision

46 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2000

See all articles by Francine Lafontaine

Francine Lafontaine

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics

Margaret E. Slade

University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 1998

Abstract

We examine theoretical predictions and econometric evidence concerning franchise contracting and sales-force compensation and suggest a number of factors that ought to influence the contracts that are written between principles and agents. For each factor, we construct the simplest theoretical model that is capable of capturing what we feel to be its essence. The comparative statics from the theoretical exercise are then used to organize our discussion of the empirical evidence, where the evidence is taken from published studies that have attempted to assess each factor's effect on the power of agent incentives. We also discuss theoretical issues and empirical results pertaining to a few topics that have been addressed in the literature but that do not fit easily into our simple modeling framework. A surprising finding of our survey of retail contracting under exclusive marks is the robust nature of the evidence: although researchers assess different industries over different time periods using a number of proxies for a given factor, their empirical findings are usually consistent with one another.

Suggested Citation

Lafontaine, Francine and Slade, Margaret E., Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision (May 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6544, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226278

Francine Lafontaine (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109-1234
United States
734-647-4915 (Phone)
734-936-0279 (Fax)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States

Margaret E. Slade

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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