Incentives in Organizations

28 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2000

See all articles by Robert S. Gibbons

Robert S. Gibbons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: August 1998

Abstract

In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations. As a point of departure, I being with a quick sketch of the classic agency model. I then discuss static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations. I conclude by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase and reinvigorated by Williamson, and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.

Suggested Citation

Gibbons, Robert S., Incentives in Organizations (August 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6695. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226364

Robert S. Gibbons (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics ( email )

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617-253-0283 (Phone)
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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