Barriere all'entrata: come calcolarle (Barriers to Entry: How to Compute Them)

25 Pages Posted: 12 May 2013 Last revised: 16 May 2018

Date Written: May 12, 2018

Abstract

Italian Abstract: Viene impostato il calcolo esplicito dei celeberrimi modelli di Kreps e Wilson (1982) e Milgrom e Roberts (1982) utilizzando funzioni lineari nel caso di una impresa monopolista pre-esistente e una potenziale entrante. Il modello calcola le strategie statiche, le strategie nei giochi ripetuti e nei giochi con informazione asimmetrica. In questi ultimi viene esplicitato anche il calcolo delle probabilitĂ  bayesiane a posteriori.

English Abstract: Explicit computations for the famous models by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) are presented, using linear functions in the case of the monopolist incumbent and a potential entrant. The model calculates the static equilibrium strategies, the strategies in repeated games and in games with asymmetric information, where the incumbent can cheat about being strong. In the latter explicit derivation of posterior Bayesian beliefs is shown.

Note: Downloadable document is in Italian.

Keywords: Entry Barriers, Repeated Games, Incomplete information, Complete Information, Nash Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Bayesian Games, beliefs, Perfect Equilibrium, Signalling, barriere all'entrata, oligopolio dinamico, giochi ripetuti, segnalazione

JEL Classification: A23, B40, B41, C70, C73, D21, D43, D82, D83, L22, L41

Suggested Citation

Miceli, Maria-Augusta, Barriere all'entrata: come calcolarle (Barriers to Entry: How to Compute Them) (May 12, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2263730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263730

Maria-Augusta Miceli (Contact Author)

University of Rome Sapienza ( email )

Dept. of Economics and Law
9, Via del Castro Laurenziano
Rome, Rome 00161
Italy

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