A Bargaining Model of Endogenous Procedures

32 Pages Posted: 13 May 2013 Last revised: 22 May 2016

See all articles by Daniel Diermeier

Daniel Diermeier

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Carlo Prato

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Razvan Vlaicu

Inter-American Development Bank; University of Maryland

Date Written: May 1, 2016

Abstract

This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players' proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural bargaining players internalize the procedures' effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy bargaining players' utilities are strictly concave and order-restricted. The paper provides equilibrium characterization, existence, and uniqueness results for this two-tier bargaining model. Although the procedural choice set is multidimensional, sequentially rational procedures feature "limited power sharing" and admit a total order. In equilibrium endogenous policy and procedure are strategic complements.

Keywords: endogenous procedures, procedural bargaining, order-restricted preferences

JEL Classification: D72, D78, C72

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Prato, Carlo and Vlaicu, Razvan, A Bargaining Model of Endogenous Procedures (May 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2263942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263942

Daniel Diermeier

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Carlo Prato

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Razvan Vlaicu (Contact Author)

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Ave NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

University of Maryland ( email )

3114 Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States

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