The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

70 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2000 Last revised: 12 Oct 2010

See all articles by Alvin E. Roth

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Elliott Peranson

National Matching Services, Inc.

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Date Written: February 1999

Abstract

We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians in the United States. Because that market exhibits many complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments reveal that the theory provides a good approximation, and furthermore the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of core convergence' result is presented to explain this; the fact that each applicant can interview for only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe in detail engineering aspects of the design process.

Suggested Citation

Roth, Alvin E. and Peranson, Elliott, The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design (February 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w6963. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226406

Alvin E. Roth (Contact Author)

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Elliott Peranson

National Matching Services, Inc.

595 Bay Street, Suite 300
Toronto, Ontario M5G 2C2
Canada

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