Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?

19 Pages Posted: 15 May 2013

See all articles by Lars Helge Hass

Lars Helge Hass

Lancaster University - Management School

Sofia Johan

Florida Atlantic University - Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Denis Schweizer

Concordia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2013


This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance (proxied by board characteristics and shareholder structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001-2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance (especially for board characteristics) show higher performance persistence. The results are stronger for short horizons and for an accounting-based view. Overall, our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that a well-structured board with more independent directors, split positions for CEOs and the chairman as well as smaller boards favors performance persistence. In terms of the shareholder structure we find evidence that lower levels of State ownership and a nonconcentrated blockholder structure is positively associated with performance persistence.

Keywords: Board Structure, China, Corporate Governance, Performance Persistence

JEL Classification: G3, P3

Suggested Citation

Hass, Lars Helge and Johan, Sofia A. and Schweizer, Denis, Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence? (May 2013). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-015. Available at SSRN: or

Lars Helge Hass (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Management School ( email )

Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Sofia A. Johan

Florida Atlantic University - Finance ( email )

777 Glades Rd
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE

Denis Schweizer

Concordia University ( email )

1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.
Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8
+1 (514) 848-2424 ext. 2926 (Phone)
+1 (514) 848-4500 (Fax)


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