Why Minority Interests May Be Encouraged by Majority Regulation: A Case Study Illustrated by Slow Money Movement

Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance, 26(6): 617-626, 2017

30 Pages Posted: 16 May 2013 Last revised: 7 Jan 2018

See all articles by Arvind Ashta

Arvind Ashta

CEREN EA 7477 Burgundy School of Business - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Minorities seeking majority legislations need to communicate the increased option set and limit the downside risk for the system. Social movements urging for change require institutional support including enabling legislation. Public policy support may require associating with similar movements or other stakeholders. Loss aversion, downside risk, crisis, and real options may be reasons for majorities to approve minority legislation.

Keywords: Slow money, microfinance, institutional economics, evolutionary economics, public choice, economic systems

JEL Classification: B25, D92, G23, G24, G28, G32, E11, O11, P4

Suggested Citation

Ashta, Arvind, Why Minority Interests May Be Encouraged by Majority Regulation: A Case Study Illustrated by Slow Money Movement (2017). Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance, 26(6): 617-626, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2265595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265595

Arvind Ashta (Contact Author)

CEREN EA 7477 Burgundy School of Business - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( email )

29 rue Sambin
21000 Dijon
France

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